The Joint Expeditionary Force: Deterrent, defender, or distraction?

For the last decade, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) has served a useful role in providing a bridge between NATO and non-NATO countries in the Nordic-Baltic region, grouping together the UK with eight Nordic and Baltic nations plus the Netherlands. It provides a flexible structure for responding to hybrid attacks and other hostile activities that are below the threshold at which NATO might become directly involved. Since Finland and Sweden joined NATO, and with the creation of a new NATO Baltic headquarters in Germany, the JEF’s future value has come into question. Ahead of the next meeting of JEF heads of government in Tallinn on December 16–17, this article looks at what different players want from the JEF, what its future relationship with NATO might be, and what impact the new U.S. administration might have on the JEF’s role.

JEF Origins and Evolution

The JEF was initially a UK-only formation, conceived at a time when British forces were overstretched by deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The concept for the force was first set out in 2012 by the UK’s then chief of the defense staff, Sir (now Lord) David Richards. He described the JEF as “capable of projecting power with global effect and influence,” and suggested that it would meet the UK’s NATO commitments while simultaneously providing reassurance and deterrence in the Middle East and the Gulf. He mentioned Denmark and Estonia (which had fought alongside UK forces in Afghanistan) as potential participants.

The JEF took on a new role and new memberships in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In the margins of NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014, seven nations (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK) signed a Letter of Intent agreeing to establish the JEF, with full operating capability by 2018. The JEF was described as “a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including humanitarian assistance, conventional deterrence and war-fighting.”

The JEF was an example of how NATO allies implemented the Framework Nations Concept, adopted at the Wales Summit. According to the concept, groups of allies would work together under the leadership of a framework nation to develop forces and capabilities. In the case of the JEF, the UK provides the headquarters—known as the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)—and the commander, plus the lead commando, airborne, armored, aviation, air, and maritime task groups.

The JEF was endorsed by NATO leaders: The Wales Summit declaration described it as facilitating “the efficient deployment of existing and emerging military capabilities and units.” Despite this, and the frequent references in JEF statements to NATO procedures and standards, the JEF is not a NATO force, but rather a coalition of the willing. Indeed, despite its name, it is not a force at all: Apart from its headquarters, it essentially consists of a catalogue of different national capabilities. By design, the units involved are supposed be deployable in a range of combinations and capable of responding to a variety of contingencies. Once at least two member states agree to do something, JEF arrangements can be triggered; other countries can then decide for themselves whether to take part in the activities in question. For the units involved in the JEF, the group has become a vehicle to increase interoperability through an intensive program of exercises. The JEF also provides a framework for regular discussions of defense and security issues among defense ministers, chiefs of defense staff, and heads of government.

In 2015, the seven JEF participants signed a Foundation Memorandum of Understanding detailing the arrangements for the JEF. The purposes of the force were described as “collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” The seven agreed that it should have a balanced range of land, sea, air, and cyber capabilities (then space was added later) that could be tailored to a specific deployment or mission. The memorandum stated that the JEF would “prepare for a full spectrum of operations up to and including high intensity operations.”

In 2017, Finland and Sweden joined the JEF, while remaining outside NATO at the time. The JEF played an important role in helping their forces become fully interoperable with NATO and providing a forum for their senior political and military figures to take part in defense consultations with the seven NATO members of the JEF.

In 2021, after Iceland became the tenth member, JEF countries issued a Policy Direction, summarizing lessons learned over the force’s first seven years. Although the JEF was still supposed to be capable of taking part in the full spectrum of military activity, the new guidance highlighted the need for it “to be able to respond effectively to competitors operating in the space below the threshold of conventional conflict.”

In October 2023, JEF leaders adopted The JEF Vision, in which they stated that the JEF provides “a range of credible military options to respond—rapidly when needed—in scenarios ranging from sub-threshold peacetime responses through to full-spectrum interventions during times of crisis or conflict, both in its core regions and beyond.” They also pledged that the JEF would “integrate with and contribute to NATO deterrence at all times.” However, now that Finland and Sweden are NATO members and collective defense is once again a higher priority than expeditionary warfare, the JEF’s future role is less clear.

Who Wants What From the JEF?

Whatever the other JEF members want, the force certainly could not continue to operate in its present form without UK leadership. The Labour government elected in July 2024 seems to be as interested as its Conservative predecessors in maintaining the JEF format. The new government is in the midst of a defense review, but the Labour Party’s manifesto describes working more closely with JEF partners as one way to strengthen NATO and make the UK safer. Luke Pollard, the minister for the armed forces, has spoken in general terms of the government’s intention to build stronger defense partnerships with JEF countries.

The UK likes the JEF because it leads it (and London seems keen to maintain its primacy within the grouping). It also likes the force’s institutional flexibility and its ability to react rapidly to various challenges: Unlike NATO, JEF decisions on deployment do not require consensus. A British officer told the Economist in 2022 that the JEF could act while NATO was thinking.

Other participants seem generally keen on the JEF continuing as well. For example, following the October 2023 severing of the Balticconnector gas pipeline and telecommunications cables between Estonia and Finland, the Swedish defense minister, Pål Jonson, said that it was “of strategic importance that the JEF increases its presence in the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic in light of the threats to critical underwater infrastructure. The JEF is a swift and flexible framework that is well-suited to help address those threats.” Soon after his statement, the JEF deployed additional units to the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic.

Finland also seems to attach importance to the JEF. The Finnish Defense Forces have stated that JEF exercises play a crucial role in their additional exercise activities. They have also highlighted their increased cooperation with JEF partners since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Like the UK, Finland appreciates the institutional and operational flexibility that the JEF brings.

The Finnish government is currently preparing a defense report for its parliament, setting out its defense policy for the first time since Finland joined NATO. Its 2021 predecessor described the JEF (along with other formats, such as the French-led European Intervention Initiative) as having “a prominent role in European defence cooperation.”

Yet the JEF does face some criticism: its advantage is supposed to be the ability to react quickly in a crisis while NATO is marshalling its (larger) resources to come in later if needed. But officials from one JEF member state, speaking privately, complained recently that the JEF’s response to the severing of the pipeline and cables in October 2023 had been too slow to be of real use: NATO deployed forces to the area more quickly than the JEF did. The force’s slower response may reflect the many current demands on limited resources: JEF members, including the UK, may be struggling to provide ships and aircraft for both NATO and JEF tasks.

Non-JEF members are more skeptical about the format. Germany has particular problems with it. Constitutionally, German forces can conduct operations only under the aegis of collective security and defense organizations (primarily the EU, NATO, and the UN). The JEF’s status as a coalition of the willing makes it impossible for Germany to cooperate with it. The inspector of the German Navy, Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack, suggested at the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn, Estonia, in May 2024 that Germany saw the JEF as a distraction from NATO activities in the Baltic region.

His view might have been linked to the impending establishment of the Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic) headquarters in Rostock, Germany, which began operations in October 2024. Subordinate to NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), the headquarters’ first commander is a German admiral, but all the JEF countries, including the UK, have seconded officers to it. Its functions are to “plan naval exercises and operations [in the Baltic Sea] and to lead naval forces assigned by NATO in peace, crisis and war.” There is a clear risk of competition for resources or duplication of tasks between CTF Baltic and the JEF.

Within NATO structures, officials generally believe that the JEF can be useful (for example, in improving interoperability) but that it could be better coordinated with NATO. On the plus side, JEF activities can support NATO’s deterrent posture in the Nordic-Baltic region, particularly at sea. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in frontline states takes care of deterrence on land, however, and increased NATO air policing from airbases in the Baltic states and reinforced air defenses reduce the need for JEF air activity. But the reality is that when resources are scarce, the same forces and assets may be needed for JEF and NATO exercises and operations. At a minimum, to ensure that the forces NATO needs in the Baltic region are available, the JEF must do more to exercise the procedures needed to transfer command of forces engaged in sub-threshold activities under a JEF umbrella to NATO in an escalating crisis. The JEF’s continued aspiration to be able to conduct “full-spectrum interventions . . . both in its core regions and beyond” is seen as unrealistic and is potentially at odds with NATO’s need to call on the same forces as part of an Article 5 response.

What Is Next for the JEF?

There are some ambitious ideas for the JEF’s future in circulation. Benjamin Tallis of the German Council on Foreign Relations expanded on a proposal by then chair of the UK House of Commons Defence Committee Tobias Ellwood for the JEF to include Poland and Ukraine and to provide a deterrent presence in Ukraine through frequent exercises and the provision of air support. Alongside others, Lord (Stuart) Peach, former UK chief of defence staff and chair of the NATO Military Committee, proposed increased JEF intelligence cooperation, enhanced ties to Germany and Canada designed to enable the JEF to enlarge its geographical coverage, a JEF role in defense innovation, and a so-called JEF Bank to invest in defense technology and capability. These are all interesting ideas, but they would require greater resources for the JEF than its members currently commit to it.

JEF leaders will hold their next summit in Tallinn on December 16–17, 2024. They need to ask themselves whether the JEF can fulfill its current range of ambitions, let alone take on other demanding tasks, without more investment. After the 2023 JEF summit in Sweden, then Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas suggested that European countries needed to invest more in defense and that JEF countries had an opportunity to lead by example. Leaders should take up this proposal in Tallinn: Two of the three Baltic states are already projected to spend more than 3 percent of GDP on defense this year, and the remaining JEF countries are all above NATO’s 2 percent target, but they could agree that all countries should reach 3 percent by 2030. Currently, the British defense budget is set to remain constant as a share of GDP for at least the next two years, with the government promising to lay out a path to spending 2.5 percent in a future budget.

Even though the JEF Vision was only recently adopted in October 2023, leaders should also launch a debate about what the JEF is best suited to doing, how realistic the vision is, and how to put the force’s commitment to “a seamless interface between national, JEF and NATO responses” into practice. For example, in a recent paper for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Antti Pihlajamaa, a Finnish military officer and former strategy lecturer at the Finnish National Defense University, argued in favor of greater integration between NATO and the JEF. Certainly, there needs to be better articulation between NATO regional plans in the JEF area and JEF Response Options (planned military activities designed for reassurance and deterrence). NATO’s own complex command arrangements for the Nordic-Baltic region—dividing it between Joint Force Command Brunssum (in the Netherlands) and Joint Force Command Norfolk (in the United States)—make this integration harder to achieve than it should be. The JEF should make use of the fact that its SJFHQ and NATO’s MARCOM are both at Northwood in the UK, and that all JEF nations except Iceland have officers seconded to CTF Baltic, to make the “seamless interface” a reality.

The scale of the challenges in the JEF’s “core regions” of the Baltic Sea, the High North, and the North Atlantic makes it essential that the JEF develop close relations with other allies active in these areas. The obvious gap is the JEF’s lack of maritime (and air) cooperation with Germany and Poland. There will be an opportunity to do more with Poland in the coming years: Its Miecznik frigate program involves building three ships (and potentially more) that are in essence the same as the UK’s Type 31 frigates, enabling a high level of interoperability between the Polish and British navies.

A JEF that is more structurally linked to NATO would facilitate cooperation with Germany. In an October 2024 joint communiqué, the UK and Germany set out several areas for future bilateral defense cooperation, including the deployment of German maritime patrol aircraft to UK bases and better coordination of efforts to protect subsea infrastructure in the North Atlantic and North Seas—though apparently not in the Baltic Sea. Such activities should clearly complement those carried out as part of JEF maritime deployments, but the JEF’s non-NATO status gets in the way of closer collaboration It would also make sense for the JEF to include or at least have closer links with Belgium, since the Belgian and Dutch navies are largely integrated, with a combined staff under the command of Admiral Benelux (the commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy).

As long as NATO continues to function and JEF countries feel confident that they can rely on the alliance’s Article 5 guarantee, it may not be necessary for the JEF to prepare for high-intensity combat. The JEF format is likely to be of the most value when a threat is ambiguous and NATO as a whole cannot agree to react, rather than when full-scale war is in the offing. In dealing with hybrid attacks or sabotage, the JEF needs to be able to deploy capabilities quickly. It may also need to work with civil powers such as police or coastguards, or with private sector owners of critical infrastructure, and must develop and then exercise procedures for conducting these interactions.