An EU senate is superfluous

The idea that the EU should create a second chamber for the European Parliament, composed of representatives from national parliaments, is a perennial favourite of member-state governments.

France backed the concept of an "EU Senate" during the negotiation of the Amsterdam treaty in 1997. And then last autumn Tony Blair proposed a second chamber in his Warsaw speech on the future of the EU.
At first sight, such an institution appears attractive. It could be a way of creating links between the European and national political systems, which sometimes co-exist in splendid isolation from each other. If some MPs spent more time in Brussels or Strasbourg, the quality of European debates in national parliaments might improve.
None the less, this particular idea raises as many questions as it answers. For a start, would creating yet another EU institution really be popular? Would it help to make the EU more comprehensible? If the new chamber were granted any real power, the Union's decision-making system would become even more complex and cumbersome than it is today. Yet a chamber with little or no power would be vulnerable to allegations that it was no more than an expensive talking-shop.
In any case, the EU's most powerful institution, the Council of Ministers, draws its members from governments which, by implication, enjoy the confidence of national parliaments. In what sense would an additional and direct representation of national parliaments add value?
The practical problems of a second chamber would be immense. The pre-1979 European Parliament was composed of national parliamentarians who were often unable or unwilling to find enough time to do the European job effectively. Whether or not there was a majority for a particular cause within the Parliament often depended on which national delegation was absent owing to key events in their own national parliament.
The claim that extra scrutiny by known and trusted national politicians would help to restore public confidence in the EU is not supported by evidence from other multilateral bodies. How many voters have heard of the national MPs who sit in the WEU Assembly, the NATO Assembly or the Council of Europe - and how many voters even know these bodies exist? Such assemblies are useful for networking, but little more.
The EU already possesses a body that represents national MPs, the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC). This is developing a useful role as a forum that enables MPs involved in EU issues to network. It would be more practical to develop COSAC than to amend the treaties to create a new institution.
It is only two years since MEPs obtained the power of co-decision with the Council over the bulk of EU legislation. Draft legislation now has to pass two hurdles in order to become law: ministers from elected governments in the Council, and then directly elected MEPs in the Parliament have to approve it. This system constitutes a double check on the quality of legislation. A further chamber would lead to an excessively complicated decision-making process.
The Parliament deserves more time to develop its new and more powerful role. Indeed, national politicians are only beginning to appreciate how co-decision is changing the European Parliament's status, while the wider public has virtually no idea. National governments - and the European Parliament itself - must try harder to explain that the Parliament's enhanced powers really do diminish the democratic deficit.
Faced with these arguments, many supporters of the second chamber have lowered their ambitions for it. Two options appear to be taking shape, both of which seek to give the second chamber a role that would avoid duplicating too much of what the existing European Parliament does.
The first is that the new body should be a "chamber of subsidiarity", policing the borders of EU competence. However, if this chamber examined Commission proposals before they were sent to the Council and the Parliament, its intervention in the legislative procedure would be too soon to be useful: these proposals are often substantially amended by the Council and the Parliament.
But neither does it make sense for the new chamber to pronounce after the legislation has passed through the other EU institutions. Each government would be likely to whip its national delegation to the new chamber to approve whatever law the Council had just passed; most governments control their national parliaments. And if such whipping failed, domestic rows between governments and oppositions would be aired and magnified through exposure at European level, which is hardly an appealing prospect.
The second option is that the new chamber should scrutinise the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and that it should take over the consultative role of the WEU Assembly on security matters. However, a European body with no real powers would risk being irrelevant. And in any case, both national parliaments and the European Parliament would continue to debate the CFSP. MEPs can already question the EU High Representative (Javier Solana) and the Council Presidency, adopt resolutions on foreign affairs, conduct inter-parliamentary relations with third countries and approve the budget for foreign policy. Does the EU really need a third level of parliamentary debate on these matters?
Instead of inventing new chambers, we should focus on improving national parliamentary scrutiny over ministers. Each national parliament is guaranteed a six-week period to consider a Commission proposal and to consult with ministers, before the Council of Ministers may adopt a position.
How this is done is, of course, up to each country. Some, such as the Nordic states, have set up impressive procedures which involve ministers going to the relevant parliamentary committee both before they travel to Brussels and on their return. There is nothing to stop other national parliaments from following this example of accountability.